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ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITIES LAW
IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE:
CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION IN
THE PROSECUTION OF
TRANSNATIONAL HEDGE FUND
FRAUD
Junsun Park*
INTRODUCTION: THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUND FRAUD
Over the last few decades, the global hedge fund industry has
grown at a surprising rate.1 In 2007, more than 10,000 hedge
funds ran their business in the global marketplaces, and they
collectively managed US$2.150 trillion. 2 Although the hedge
fund industry declined in 2008 due to the financial crisis, its
recovery is well in progress now.3 Indeed, the number of hedge
funds in operation in 2010 reached 9500, and their total assets
under management were US$1.920 trillion.4
As the hedge fund industry has expanded, securities law violations by hedge fund managers have also increased.5 Such se* Visiting Scholar, Columbia University Law School (2013–2014); S.J.D.
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1. George Sami, Comment, A Comparative Analysis of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States and Europe, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 275, 275
(2009).
2. MARKO MASLAKOVIC, THECITYUK, HEDGE FUNDS 2 (2011), available at
http://www.thecityuk.com/assets/Uploads/Hedge-funds-2011.pdf.
3. See id. at 1.
4. Id. at 1–2.
5. Linda Chatman Thomsen et al., Hedge Funds: An Enforcement Perspective, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 541, 555–56 (2008); see also Paul M. Jonna, Comment, In Search of Market Discipline: The Case for Indirect Hedge Fund Reg-
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curities law violations can significantly impair the integrity of
the market and threaten the confidence of investors. In recent
years, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“U.S.
SEC” or “SEC”) has filed a number of enforcement actions
against hedge funds and their managers.6 For example, in 2009
the SEC and the U.S. Department of Justice (“U.S. DOJ” or
“DOJ”) initiated their enforcement proceedings against Raj Rajaratnam, a hedge fund manager, for insider trading.7 As one of
the biggest insider trading rings on record,8 his fraud produced
millions of dollars in illegal benefits.9 Moreover, Rajaratnam’s
scheme affected securities from various major companies, including Google, Hilton, and Intel to name a few.10 In light of
these negative effects, securities regulators have called for
strict enforcement for hedge fund fraud.11
Despite the need for strict enforcement, securities regulators
often face difficulties in combating hedge fund fraud. Hedge
funds can make fraudulent schemes more difficult to detect due

ulation, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 989, 1008 (2008); see also SEC, IMPLICATIONS OF
THE
GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS
72–75
(2003),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf [hereinafter 2003 SEC
STAFF REPORT].
6. Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 555–56.
7. See Complaint at 1, SEC v. Galleon Mgmt. LP, 274 F.R.D. 120
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 09 Civ. 8811) (JSR) (Oct. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/comp21255.pdf; see also Complaint at 1, United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 MAG 2306 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15,
2009),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/hedgefund/rajaratnamrajetalcomplaint.pdf.
8. Azam Ahmed & Guibert Gates, The Galleon Network, N.Y. TIMES (May
11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/03/08/business/galleongraphic.html; Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office S.D.N.Y., Hedge Fund
Billionaire Raj Rajaratnam Found Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court of Insider
Trading
Charges
1
(May
11,
2011),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/May11/rajaratnamrajverdictpr.
pdf; SEC v. Rajaratnam, 822 F. Supp. 2d 432, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); United
States v. Rajaratnam, 802 F. Supp. 2d 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
9. Press Release, SEC, SEC Obtains Record $92.8 Million Penalty
Against
Raj
Rajaratnam
(Nov.
8,
2011),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-233.htm.
10. Litigation Release No. 21284, SEC, SEC Charges 13 Additional Individuals and Entities in Galleon Insider Trading Case (Nov. 5, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21284.htm.
11. See 2003 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 72–75; see also Thomsen
et al., supra note 5, at 555.
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to the complexity of the fund structures and operations.12 Indeed, as the hedge fund industry has expanded beyond borders,
securities fraud involving hedge funds has also become transnational. 13 For instance, even if hedge fund managers are
working in the United States or United Kingdom (“U.K.”), the
hedge funds themselves are often located in tax havens of lessregulated countries.14 Furthermore, certain managers operate
both domestic and offshore funds at the same time.15
In order to respond to the global expansion of securities
fraud, including hedge fund fraud, domestic securities regulators must act transnationally. 16 With no single regulatory
scheme to govern all global markets, each country has sought
to apply its domestic laws extraterritorially to combat transnational securities fraud; 17 however, in order to enforce domestic
securities laws that reach extraterritorially, regulators need to
secure assistance from foreign authorities.18 Because enforcement of law is limited within a territory, domestic regulators
cannot generally use their enforcement power within the terri-

12. See Thomas C. Pearson, When Hedge Funds Betray a Creditor Committee’s Fiduciary Role: New Twist on Insider Trading in the International Financial Markets, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 165, 175–76 (2008).
13. See Hedge Funds in the Crosshairs: The Year in Review, 41 SEC. REG. &
L.
REP.
(BNA)
No.
519
(Mar.
23,
2009),
available
at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Goldsmith-Ahn-BooneHedgeFundsInTheCrosshairs.pdf [hereinafter Hedge Funds in the Crosshairs].
14. See Thomas C. Pearson & Julia Lin Pearson, Protecting Global Financial Market Stability and Integrity: Strengthening SEC Regulation of Hedge
Funds, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1, 26–27 & n.145 (2007) (quoting FIN.
SERVS. AUTH., HEDGE FUNDS AND THE FSA: FEEDBACK STATEMENT ON DP16, 6
(2003), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/fs16.pdf); see also
2003 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 10; see also FRANÇOIS-SERGE
LHABITANT, HANDBOOK OF HEDGE FUNDS 87–88 (2006).
15. See LHABITANT, supra note 14, at 108–11 (explaining mirror structures
and master-feeder structures).
16. See Kun Young Chang, Multinational Enforcement of U.S. Securities
Laws: The Need for the Clear and Restrained Scope of Extraterritorial Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 89, 90 (2003).
17. See id. at 90–91.
18. J. WILLIAM HICKS, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. SECURITIES LAW
§ 11:53 (2012); see also Sec. & Futures Comm’n, 58 ENFORCEMENT REP. 6, 7
(2008),
available
at
http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/doc/EN/speeches/public/enforcement/08/may_08.pdf.
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tory of other countries.19 The regulators, therefore, have to obtain cooperation from other countries, particularly when they
enforce their own laws against fraud involving cross-border
transactions.20
Recognizing the territorial limits on enforcement power,
many jurisdictions provide a legislative framework for authorizing domestic securities regulators to assist foreign authorities.21 Based on these pieces of legislation, securities regulators
entered into international networks to execute cross-border assistance. 22 Popular networks for international securities enforcement include Memoranda of Understanding (“MOUs”) and
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (“MLATs”).23 Since 1982, the
SEC has signed a number of bilateral MOUs with different foreign authorities.24 Since 2002, the International Organization
of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) also has promoted a multilateral MOU (“IOSCO MMOU” or “MMOU”),25 listing ninetyseven authorities as full signatories.26 In addition to the MOUs,
the United States currently has a number of MLATs with vari-

19. INT’L BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION
9–10
(2009),
available
at
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=ECF39839A217-4B3D-8106-DAB716B34F1E.
20. HICKS, supra note 18, § 11:53; see also Sec. & Futures Comm’n, supra
note 18, at 7.
21. Felice B. Friedman et al., Taking Stock of Information Sharing in Securities Enforcement Matters, 10 J. FIN. CRIME 37, 40–41 (2002); see also
HICKS, supra note 18, § 11:54.
22. Friedman et al., supra note 21, at 41.
23. See OFFICE OF INT’L AFFAIRS, SEC, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN
SECURITIES
LAW
ENFORCEMENT
3–4
(2004),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_enforce/intercoop.pdf (last visited
Mar. 19, 2012).
24. Cooperative
Arrangements
with
Foreign
Regulators,
SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_cooparrangements.shtml (last visited
Feb. 28, 2012).
25. International Enforcement Assistance, SEC OFFICE OF INT’L AFFAIRS,
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_crossborder.shtml (last visited Sept.
10, 2011) [hereinafter SEC International Enforcement Assistance].
26. IOSCO
MMOU:
Current
Signatories
97,
IOSCO,
http://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfm?section=mou_siglist (last visited Nov.
12, 2013) [hereinafter Current Signatories]. Currently, twenty-three authorities “have committed to seeking the legal authority necessary to enable them
to become full signatories to the IOSCO MMOU.” Id.
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ous foreign countries.27 Despite these efforts, current network
mechanisms promoting cooperation have not been effective in
combatting multinational hedge fund fraud. In particular, although many securities regulators across the world have sought
to cooperate through international networks, defects in the
network mechanisms themselves and a lack of domestic legal
authority impede effective cooperation among regulators.
In seeking how to overcome these obstacles, this article will
explore ways that promote international cooperation in detecting, investigating, and prosecuting cross-border hedge fund
fraud. In particular, it will describe the trends toward globalization of hedge fund fraud. Next, it will discuss how to enforce
national securities laws cooperatively by using international
network mechanisms. Finally, this study will provide recommendations for reforming the international securities enforcement system, thereby achieving more effective cooperation in
combatting hedge fund fraud.
I. AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS REGARDING
HEDGE FUNDS AND THEIR MANAGERS
A. Overview
Securities fraud schemes employed by hedge fund managers
are not unique to the hedge fund context. 28 Most commonly,
securities violations committed by hedge fund professionals fall
into traditional fraud categories; however,29 hedge fund managers are more easily enticed to employ fraudulent schemes
27. DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, SEC, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL § 3.3.6.3 (2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf; see
also Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Switz., May 25,
1973, 27 U.S.T. 2019 (entered into force on Jan. 23, 1977) [hereinafter U.S.Switz. MLAT]; see also Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Can., Mar. 18, 1985, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-14 [hereinafter U.S.Can. MLAT]; see also Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-U.K., Jan. 6, 1994, 1994 U.S.T. 205 (1995) (entered into force on
Dec. 2, 1996) [hereinafter U.S.-U.K. MLAT]; see also Agreement on Mutual
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-H.K., Apr. 15, 1997, 1997 U.S.T.
115 (1997) (entered into force on Jan. 21, 2000) [hereinafter U.S.-H.K.
MLAT]; see also Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters,
U.S.-S. Korea, Nov. 23, 1993, 1993 U.S.T. 135 (1995) (entered into force on
May 23, 1997) [hereinafter U.S.-S. Korea MLAT].
28. 2003 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 73.
29. See id. at 73–74; Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 555.

236

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 39:1

because they have the motive and ability to do so.30 For example, they routinely handle a large amount of money,31 employ
high risk investment strategies, 32 are compensated based on
their performance,33 operate funds largely at their discretion,34
have close connections with other financial entities,35 and have
a favorable environment to engage in misrepresentation.36 Possible violations may include misappropriation of funds, insider
trading, and market manipulation.37
Hedge funds tend to make fraudulent schemes more difficult
to detect due to the complexity of the fund structures and operations.38 Most importantly, as the hedge fund industry has expanded beyond national borders, securities fraud involving
hedge funds has also become transnational.39 For example, although many hedge fund managers work in the United States
or U.K., the hedge funds themselves are often located outside
these countries in order to maximize the tax benefits and lower
regulatory compliance costs.40 Furthermore, certain managers
operate both domestic and offshore funds at the same time.41
Such multinational hedge funds are generally set up as a mirror structure or a master-feeder structure.42 In the course of
the operation, the multinational fund managers conduct for-

30. See Richard Strohmenger, Note, Insider Trading and Hedge Funds: A
Dangerous Pair, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 523, 532–34 (2010).
31. See 2003 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 73.
32. Strohmenger, supra note 30, at 533.
33. Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 558; see also WULF ALEXANDER KAAL,
HEDGE FUND REGULATION BY BANKING SUPERVISION – A COMPARATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 24 (2006).
34. See 2003 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 73; see also Thomsen et
al., supra note 5, at 557, 567; DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF
HEDGE FUNDS 273 (2005).
35. Pearson, supra note 12, at 175.
36. See Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 558–59.
37. See id. at 542.
38. See Pearson, supra note 12, at 175–76.
39. See Hedge Funds in the Crosshairs, supra note 13.
40. See Pearson & Pearson, supra note 14, at 26–27 & n.145 (quoting FIN.
SERVS. AUTH., supra note 14, at 6); see also 2003 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra
note 5, at 10; see also FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 14, at 6; see also
LHABITANT, supra note 14, at 87–88.
41. LHABITANT, supra note14, at 108–11 (explaining mirror structures and
master-feeder structures).
42. See id.
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eign or cross-border transactions. 43 Furthermore, hedge fund
managers often use Internet communication and networking to
expand their businesses worldwide.44
Given the circumstances, securities fraud committed by
hedge fund managers has become largely transnational.45 The
trend toward the internationalization of hedge fund frauds has
become particularly evident in enforcement actions targeting
misappropriation, insider trading, and market manipulation.
B. Misappropriation and Hedge Funds
Misappropriation of funds entails “the application of another’s property or money dishonestly to one’s own use.”46 Motives
to misappropriate hedge funds may vary among managers.
Some may manage the funds in a legitimate manner at the beginning of their operation, deciding later to employ a fraudulent scheme when encountering financial difficulty. 47 Others,
however, may create a hedge fund entity solely for the purpose
of misusing investors’ money for their own sake.
If so inclined, hedge fund managers are able to commit misappropriation because they operate with a large amount of
money in day-to-day investment.48 Furthermore, managers can
avoid investors’ surveillance simply by misrepresenting the
profitability of the funds.49 Investors may not suspect misappropriation if the fund looks profitable on paper.50 For this reason, when managers misappropriate hedge fund assets, they
43. See id. at 109–10 (explaining the transfer of funds).
44. See, e.g., Complaint at 4–5, 8, 45–51, SEC v. Ficeto, CV–11–1637 GHK
(RZx)
(C.D.
Cal.
Feb.
24,
2011),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21865.pdf
[hereinafter
Ficeto Complaint] (addressing the Internet communication between Colin
Heatherington, a Canadian resident, and Tony Ahn, an American resident).
45. See Hedge Funds in the Crosshairs, supra note 13.
46. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1088 (9th ed. 2009).
47. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office S.D.N.Y., Chief Executive
Officer of Bayou Funds Sentenced to 20 Years in Federal Prison for Massive
Investor
Fraud
(Apr.14,
2008),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/April08/israelsamuelsentencep
r.pdf; see also Nick S. Dhesi, Note, The Conman and the Sheriff: SEC Jurisdiction and the Role of Offshore Financial Centers in Modern Securities
Fraud, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1345, 1360 (2010).
48. See 2003 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 73.
49. See Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 558–59; see also 2003 SEC STAFF
REPORT, supra note 5, at 74.
50. See Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 559.
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usually then misrepresent fund operations to conceal the evidence. 51 To that end, the managers may fabricate the fund’s
appearance by using false documentation.52 The misrepresentation enables the managers to disguise their violations and to
deceive investors into remaining in the fund.53
A typical misappropriation involving hedge funds may become more complicated with hedge funds that are globally organized and thereby involve foreign or cross-border transactions. 54 For example, in a master-feeder structure, investors
put their money into a domestic or offshore feeder fund, and
the feeder funds then reinvest the money in a master fund.55
Conversely, in redemption of shares, a master fund pays a domestic or offshore feeder fund for shares, and the feeder funds
then repay individual investors.56
Regardless of whether hedge funds are globally organized,
their managers may transfer money to foreign bank accounts
after misappropriation.57 This transaction can be designed to
facilitate other fraudulent schemes, including money laundering.58 In particular, the money laundering scheme enables the
managers to conceal the source of the money and use it for
their own purpose, avoiding regulatory nets.59
C. Insider Trading and Hedge Funds
Unlawful insider trading involves “buying or selling a security, in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust
and confidence, while in possession of material, nonpublic information about the security.”60 In recent years, many insider

51. 2003 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 74; see also Thomsen et al.,
supra note 5, at 560, 567.
52. 2003 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 74; see also Thomsen et al.,
supra note 5, at 560, 567.
53. See Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 559.
54. See LHABITANT, supra note 14, at 109–10.
55. Id. at 109.
56. Id. at 109–10.
57. See, e.g., Information at 12–15, United States v. Madoff, 09 CRIM 213
(Mar.
10,
2009),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madoff/20090310criminalinfo.pdf.
58. See, e.g., id.
59. See, e.g., id. at 13–15.
60. Insider Trading, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm (last
visited Mar. 7, 2011).
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trading cases have involved hedge funds and their managers.61
The SEC also has considered “hedge fund insider trading as a
top priority”62 for its enforcement program.63 This results from
concerns that high-risk investment strategies and performance-based compensation of hedge funds may entice managers to devise insider trading schemes.64 Also, in day-to-day operations, hedge funds develop close relationships with corporate clients and investment bankers who possess material nonpublic information. 65 This operational environment enables
hedge fund managers to obtain inside information.66
One major concern involves the investment strategies employed by hedge fund managers.67 These strategies usually contain various high-risk techniques.68 In order to reduce the investment risks, hedge fund managers may seek to obtain information regarding financial events. In some instances, the
managers may trade on material information that is available
to them, but not yet disclosed to the public.69 For example, a
hedge fund manager employing an event-driven strategy might
make transactions based on nonpublic information regarding

61. See DONNA M. NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT:
CASE AND MATERIALS 467 (3rd ed. 2012); see, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC
Charges 14 in Wall Street Insider Trading Ring (Mar. 1, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-28.htm; Press Release, SEC, SEC
Charges Billionaire Hedge Fund Manager Raj Rajaratnam with Insider Trading (Oct. 16, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-221.htm; Press
Release, SEC, SEC Charges Hedge Fund Managers and Traders in $30 Million Expert Network Insider Trading Scheme (Feb. 8, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-40.htm.
62. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges 14 in Wall Street Insider Trading
Ring, supra note 61.
63. Id.; see also Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 577 (citing Examining
Enforcement of Criminal Insider Trading and Hedge Fund Activity: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Congr. (2006) (testimony of Linda Chatman Thomsen, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/ts120506lct.pdf).
64. Strohmenger, supra note 30, at 533.
65. See NAGY ET AL., supra note 61, at 467; Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at
578–81; Pearson, supra note 12, at 175.
66. Pearson, supra note 12, at 173–77.
67. Strohmenger, supra note 30, at 533.
68. Id.; Pearson & Pearson, supra note 14, at 19–20.
69. See Strohmenger, supra note 30, at 533.
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corporate “bankruptcies, reorganizations, and mergers.” 70 Indeed, hedge funds that function as lenders or substantial investors in a corporation may receive information in their capacity
that has not been shared with the general public.71
Another concern is that performance-based compensation of
hedge funds can also induce managers to commit illegal insider
trading.72 Because performance is closely related to compensation in hedge funds, managers might trade on inside information in order to increase their personal income.73 In addition, high water marks and hurdle rates designed to limit performance fees might pressure managers enough to consider insider trading.74 Under the provision of high water marks, each
term fund managers have to achieve a better profit than the
previous one in order to receive a performance fee.75 Under the
provision of hurdle rates, they must make more profits than
the “minimum investment performance.” 76 In these circumstances, managers are pressured to perform, which could lead
them to commit insider trading.77
A final concern is that the operational environments of hedge
funds enable the managers to obtain confidential information
from investors or brokerage firms.78 Hedge fund investors not
only have the ability to commit insider trading, but also the
motivation.79 Some investors work as officials in other corporations, frequently dealing with corporate inside information. 80
Such investors might deliver corporate information to their
fund managers,81 aiming to benefit the funds that they invest

70. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE,
LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 3 (Apr. 1999); Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 578.
71. Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 578–79; see also Strohmenger, supra
note 30, at 533.
72. Strohmenger, supra note 30, at 533.
73. See id.
74. See 2003 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 62–63.
75. Id. at 62.
76. Id. at 63.
77. See Strohmenger, supra note 30, at 533.
78. See NAGY ET AL., supra note 61, at 467; Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at
578–81; Pearson, supra note 12, at 175.
79. See Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 578–79.
80. See id. at 578.
81. Id.
AND THE

2014]

TRANSNAT'L HEDGE FUND FRAUD

241

in. In light of their access and motives, hedge fund investors as
corporate officials have great potential for insider trading.82
Outside entities assisting hedge funds also have the capacity
and motive to be involved in insider trading.83 In particular, a
number of investment banks provide prime brokerage services
to hedge funds.84 While working with “public companies, mutual funds, and other hedge funds,”85 investment banks usually
handle nonpublic information. 86 Furthermore, many seek to
maintain hedge fund clients because hedge funds trade regularly and frequently, which enables the banks to collect large
amounts of service fees.87 Thus, in order to maintain good relationships with hedge fund clients, investment bankers might
transfer nonpublic information to those clients.88
In light of such risks, it is not surprising that the SEC has
recently initiated a number of enforcement proceedings against
hedge fund managers for insider trading.89 Regulators, however, may face difficulties when investigating insider trading during the enforcement process. These complications typically
arise because of the international aspects of hedge fund operations. For example, a hedge fund manager can globally organize hedge fund entities,90 employ overseas transactions,91 transfer money across borders, 92 invest in foreign securities,93 and
work with foreign persons or entities.94

82. See id.
83. See NAGY ET AL., supra note 61, at 467; see also Thomsen et al., supra
note 5, at 580.
84. Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 580.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see also Strohmenger, supra note 30, at 534.
89. Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 555.
90. Pearson, supra note 12, at 175–76; see, e.g., Complaint at 5–6, SEC v.
Lyon,
605
F.Supp.2d
531
(S.D.N.Y.
2009),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2006/comp19942.pdf
[hereinafter
Lyon Complaint].
91. See LHABITANT, supra note 14, at 109–10.
92. Complaint at 40, SEC v. Galleon Mgmt. LP, 683 F.Supp.2d 316
(S.D.N.Y.
2010)
(No.
09
Civ.
8811),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21397.pdf.
93. See. e.g., id. at 11, 40 (describing the investment in a Canadian company’s stock).
94. See. e.g., id. at 39; Lyon Complaint, supra note 90, at 10.
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D. Market Manipulation and Hedge Funds
Market manipulation refers to “intentional or willful conduct
designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities.”95 Typical manipulative
conduct might involve circulating false information and using
deceptive trading practices.96 Such manipulative schemes are
often attractive to hedge fund managers because they can falsify their performance by maneuvering markets in their favor.97
Because performance is directly related to compensation, managers are enticed to trade manipulatively in order to increase
their income.98
In addition, hedge fund managers have the ability to manipulate markets due to their strategic trading activities,99 as well
as due to the large amount of fund money at their discretionary
use.100 This operational environment enables managers to exploit fund investment for their manipulative trading.101 For example, a hedge fund manager may invest the fund in stock, using various trading techniques in order to maneuver the price
of the stock.102 Then, he directs the fund to buy the stock at the
raised price.103 Finally, the manager can fabricate his performance based on the manipulative transactions.104
Similar to the situations in misappropriation and insider
trading, a typical manipulation case may become more complicated with hedge funds that are globally managed. 105 Many
hedge fund managers in the course of day-to-day business invest funds in foreign markets and, in doing so, frequently
95. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976); see also NAGY
note 61, at 615.
96. See Manipulation, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/tmanipul.htm
(last visited Nov. 7, 2013); see also NAGY ET AL., supra note 61, at 615–16.
97. Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 617.
98. See id.
99. See Pearson, supra note 12, at 174, 176.
100. See 2003 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 73; see also HAMMER ET
AL., supra note 34, 273.
101. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Securities Professionals
and Traders in International Hedge Fund Portfolio Pumping Scheme (Feb.
24, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-51.htm.
102. See, e.g., id.
103. See, e.g., Ficeto Complaint, supra note 44, at 4.
104. See, e.g., id.
105. See Pearson, supra note 12, at 175–76 (discussing difficulties in enforcing insider trading regulation).
ET AL., supra
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communicate with overseas professionals,106 making their activities difficult to detect and prosecute. A more serious concern
is that some managers violating securities laws may intentionally make their schemes transnational in order to avoid regulatory detection.
II. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN INVESTIGATING AND
PROSECUTING SECURITIES FRAUD
A. Domestic Legislation Enabling Enforcement Cooperation
In order to respond to the global expansion of securities
fraud, including hedge fund fraud, domestic securities regulators must act transnationally.107 With no single regulation to
govern all global markets, each country has sought to apply its
domestic laws extraterritorially to combat transnational securities fraud.108 In the United States, the SEC and the DOJ can
currently apply the antifraud provisions of U.S. securities laws
to certain overseas transactions. 109 The U.S. Supreme Court
discarded the effects and conduct tests in Morrison,110 yet Congress, immediately after this decision, enacted a provision in
the Dodd-Frank Act re-authorizing the SEC and the DOJ to
use these two tests.111 Although national securities laws extend
extraterritorially, the ability to gather facts and evidence of a
violation, and the ability to prosecute that violation, is not
guaranteed.112 Because enforcement of law is limited within a
territory, domestic regulators generally cannot use their en-

106. See, e.g., Ficeto Complaint, supra note 44, at 4–5, 8, 45–51 (addressing
the Internet communication between a trader in Canada and a trader in the
United States).
107. See Chang, supra note 16, at 90.
108. See id. at 90–91.
109. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1864–65 (2010) [hereinafter
Dodd-Frank Act].
110. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S.Ct. 2869, 2879–88 (2010); see
also Letter from Hannah L. Buxbaum, Ind. Univ., Maurer Sch. of Law, Comments on Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action Release No. 3463174,
File
No.
4-617,
1
(Feb.
18,
2011),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-14.pdf.
111. See Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b); see also HICKS, supra note 18, § 11:50.
112. See INT’L BAR ASS’N, supra note 19, at 9–10; see also Sec. & Futures
Comm’n, supra note 18, at 6, 7.
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forcement power within the territory of other countries. 113
Thus, securities regulators should cooperate with each other to
successfully enforce national securities laws.114
For this reason, many countries have established provisions
authorizing their securities regulators to provide cross-border
assistance. For example, the United States has Section 21(a)(2)
of the Securities Exchange Act (“Exchange Act”);115 Switzerland
has Article 38 of the Federal Act on Stock Exchange and Securities Trading (“Stock Exchange Act”)116 and Article 42 of the
Federal Act on the Financial Market Supervision Act (“Financial Market Supervision Act”);117 Canada has Sections 11(1)(b),
126, 143.10(1), and 153 of the Ontario Securities Act; 118 the
U.K. has Sections 169 and 354 of the Financial Services and
Markets Act of 2000;119 Hong Kong has Section 186 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance;120 and South Korea has Article
437 of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets
Act (“Financial Investment Act”). 121 These provisions enable
domestic securities regulators to obtain evidence located
abroad, thereby overcoming the obstacles to enforcing laws
113. INT’L BAR ASS’N, supra note 19, at 9–10.
114. See HICKS, supra note 18, §11:53; see also Sec. & Futures Comm’n, supra note 18, at 7.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(2) (2006).
116. Federal Act on Stock Exchange and Securities Trading (Stock Exchange Act, SESTA) of March 24, 1995, art. 38 (Jan. 1, 2009) (Switz.), available
at
http://www.six-exchangeregulation.com/download/admission/regulation/federal_acts/sesta_en.pdf (unofficial translation).
117. Federal Act on the Financial Market Supervisory Authority (Financial
Market Supervision Act, FINMASA) of 22 June 2007 (2009), art. 42 (July 1,
2013) (Switz.), available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/9/956.1.en.pdf.
118. Securities Act, R.S.O. 2011, c. S.5, §§ 11(1)(b), 126(1)(b), 143.10(1), 153
(Can.),
available
at
http://www.elaws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_90s05_e.htm.
119. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, §§ 169, 354 (U.K.),
available
at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/8/pdfs/ukpga_20000008_en.pdf.
120. Securities and Futures Ordinance, (2003) Cap. 571, § 186 (H.K.),
available
at
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_pdf.nsf/6799165D2FEE3FA94825755E003
3E532/5167961DDC96C3B7482575EF001C7C2D/$FILE/CAP_571_e_b5.pdf.
121. FINANCIAL INVESTMENT SERVICES AND CAPITAL MARKETS ACT art. 437 (S.
Kor.),
available
at
http://www.fsc.go.kr/eng/lr/list03.jsp?menu=0203&bbsid=BBS0087 (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
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against transnational securities fraud.122 With no single regulator to govern the global financial market,123 securities regulators can most effectively combat globalized securities fraud by
cooperating with one another.124
B. International Networks for Enforcement Cooperation
The aforementioned legislation enables securities regulators
to assist foreign counterparts in enforcing domestic laws.125 The
execution of this assistance allows for certain arrangements
among nations.126 Although ad hoc arrangements can be used
by regulators in a particular case, prearranged international
networks are more common.127 Popular networks for international securities enforcement include MOUs, particularly those
that are bilateral and multilateral, and MLATs.128 MOUs are
nonbinding arrangements allowing regulators to share information and to provide assistance to their foreign counterparts. 129 Because of their flexibility, MOUs are increasingly
considered key tools for transnational cooperation among securities regulators. 130 By contrast, MLATs are less flexible because establishing MLATs involves complicated procedures,
such as diplomatic negotiation and legislative ratification.131 As
treaties, MLATs are legally binding agreements and typically
122. See Friedman et al., supra note 21, at 41.
123. See Chang, supra note 16, at 90.
124. See SEC International Enforcement Assistance, supra note 25.
125. See Friedman et al., supra note 21, at 40 (stating that the legislation
enables securities regulators to share information freely with their foreign
counterparts).
126. See id.
127. See SEC International Enforcement Assistance, supra note 25.
128. See OFFICE OF INT’L AFFAIRS, supra note 23, at 3–4.
129. Elliott M. Beard, A Critical Analysis of the Effects Of Colello v. SEC on
International Securities Law Enforcement Agreements, 7 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 271, 274 (1996).
130. See Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in
Securities Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 883, 885, 894 (2009); see also Dinah Shelton, Soft Law, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 68,
75 (David Armstrong ed., 2009) (describing the increasing importance of “soft
law,” which includes “any written international instrument, other than a
treaty, containing principles, norms, standards, or other statements of expected behavior”).
131. See Caroline A.A. Greene, International Securities Law Enforcement:
Recent Advances in Assistance and Cooperation, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
635, 649 (1994).
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require regulators to provide assistance to each other in criminal matters.132 In recent years, countries have relied largely on
such international networks to promote cooperation in securities enforcement.133
1. Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs)
a. Bilateral MOUs
i. Overview
MOUs refer to “regulator-to-regulator arrangements regarding information sharing and cooperation in securities matters.”134 These arrangements are memorialized in nonbinding
agreements.135 Since 1982, the SEC has signed bilateral MOUs
on enforcement cooperation with a number of authorities from
different jurisdictions, including Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jersey, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, and the U.K.136 The United States
concluded MOUs with Switzerland in 1982137 and 1987,138 Canada in 1988,139 the U.K. in 1991,140 and Hong Kong in 1995.141
132. Id. at 640; see also Charles R. Mills et al., International Enforcement:
Enforcement Actions in the Global Market, in THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT
MANUAL: TACTICS AND STRATEGIES 489, 498–99 (Richard M. Phillips ed.,
1997).
133. Although countries can use the Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Convention or Convention), this mechanism suffers a number of problems all its own. Greene,
supra note 131, at 639–40 (listing the limitations of using the Hague Convention); Beard, supra note 129, at 272.
134. DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, SEC, supra note 27, § 3.3.6.3.
135. Beard, supra note 129, at 274.
136. SEC International Enforcement Assistance, supra note 25; SEC, Cooperative Arrangements with Foreign Regulators, supra note 24.
137. Memorandum of Understanding, U.S.-Switz., Aug. 31, 1982, available
at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/switzerland.pdf [hereinafter 1982 U.S.-Switz. MOU] (Memorandum of Understanding between the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the Government of
Switzerland). As the first MOU for global enforcement cooperation, the 1982
MOU signed by the United States with Switzerland is historically important.
Each part of this MOU demonstrates how difficult enforcement cooperation
was in the early stage. The United States has modeled other MOUs on this
first MOU with some revision. MARVIN G. PICKHOLZ, SECURITIES CRIME § 4:45
(11th ed. 2012). Given these circumstances, analyzing the 1982 MOU be-
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tween the United States and Switzerland can be useful to understanding other MOUs’ contents and to finding ways of overcoming their problems. This
chapter, therefore, includes analysis of the 1982 MOU, even though “[t]his
MOU has now been replaced by [the 1987 MOU].” David Chaikin, The Impact
of Swiss Principles of Mutual Assistance on Financial and Fiscal Crimes, 16
L.J.
192,
196
n.13
(2006),
available
at
REVENUE
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1173&context=rlj
&seiredir=1#search=%221982%20MEMORANDUM%20UNDERSTANDING%20GO
VERNMENT%20SWITZERLAND%22.
138. Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters and Ancillary Administrative Proceedings, U.S.-Switz., Nov. 10,
1987,
27
I.L.M.
480
(1988),
available
at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20693205.pdf?acceptTC=true (Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Switzerland). In addition to the 1982 and
1987 MOUs, on November 3, 1993, the United States exchanged diplomatic
notes with Switzerland. Letter from Warren Christopher, Sec’y of State, U.S.,
to Carlo Jagmetti, Ambassador of Switz., at 1 (Nov. 3, 1993), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@internationalaffairs/documents/file/ss
c93.pdf [hereinafter 1993 U.S.-Switz. Notes]. This has expanded the range of
assistance that the SEC could obtain under the 1987 MOU; in particular, the
SEC has been able to “use information obtained in Switzerland as evidence in
civil and administrative proceedings involving a wide array of securitiesrelated offenses.” Exchange of Diplomatic Notes Between the United States
and Switzerland, SEC NEWS DIGEST 1, 2 (Nov. 3, 1993), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/1993/dig110393.pdf [hereinafter SEC NEWS
DIGEST]; see also 1993 U.S.-Switz. Notes, supra, at 1–2 (Letter from Warren
Christopher, Sec’y of State, U.S., to Carlo Jagmetti, Ambassador of Switzerland).
139. Memorandum of Understanding on Administration and Enforcement
of Securities Laws, U.S.-Can., Jan. 7, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 412, available at
http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/canada.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Can.
MOU] (Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission and the Ontario Securities Commission, the
Commission des Valeurs Mobilieres du Quebec, and the British Columbia
Securities Commission).
140. Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Assistance and the Exchange of Information, U.S.-U.K., Sept. 25, 1991, International Series Release
No.
323,
1991
SEC
LEXIS
1997,
available
at
http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/ukingdom_enfcoop.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-U.K. MOU] (Memorandum of Understanding between the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission and Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry
and Securities and Investments Board). As the second MOU between the
United States and the U.K., this agreement has replaced the previous 1986
MOU. Memorandum of Understanding on Exchange of Information, U.S.-
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ii. Scope of Assistance
Whether a domestic regulator can successfully prosecute an
international fraud case depends largely on the assistance that
can be obtained from foreign authorities.142 If foreign authorities can provide assistance by leveraging their own domestic
power, a domestic regulator can prosecute international fraud
as effectively as a local case.143 On the other hand, if foreign
authorities so requested are restricted from using their power
fully, a domestic regulator may be unable to obtain crucial
pieces of evidence.144
Given the crucial importance of substantial transnational assistance, most MOUs, including those signed by the United
States with Switzerland, Canada, the U.K., and Hong Kong,
define the scope of assistance.145 Under the 1982 MOU between
U.K., Sept. 23, 1986, International Series Release No. 4, 1986 SEC LEXIS
2308,
available
at
http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/ukingdom_enfcoop.pdf
(Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the Department of Trade and Industry of the United
Kingdom); see also MARC I. STEINBERG, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW: A
CONTEMPORARY AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 221 (1999).
141. Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and Enforcement of Securities Law and Declaration on Cooperation and
Supervision of Cross-Border Investment Management Act, U.S.-H.K., Oct. 5,
1995,
1995
SEC
LEXIS
2810,
available
at
http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/hongkong.pdf [hereinafter U.S.H.K. MOU] (Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission).
142. ANA CARVAJAL & JENNIFER ELLIOTT, INT’L MONETARY FUND, THE
CHALLENGE OF ENFORCEMENT IN SECURITIES MARKETS: MISSION IMPOSSIBLE? 22
(2009),
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09168.pdf; see also SEC International Enforcement Assistance, supra note 25.
143. See Technical Comm., Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, Principles for Memo§
7
(1991),
randa
of
Understanding
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD17.pdf.
144. See id.; see also Sec. & Futures Comm’n, supra note 18, at 7.
145. See 1982 U.S.-Switz. MOU, supra note 137, pt. III, para. 1; Agreement
XVI of the Swiss Bankers’ Association with Regard to the Handling of Requests for Information from the SEC on the Subject of Misuse of Insider Information, arts. 4, 9, Aug. 31, 1982, 22 I.L.M. 7 (1983) [hereinafter Agreement XVI of the Swiss Bankers’ Association]; U.S.-Can. MOU, supra note
139, art. 2; U.S.-U.K. MOU, supra note 140, pt. II, para. 6; U.S.-H.K. MOU,
supra note 141, para. 3.1.
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the United States and Switzerland, the Swiss Bankers’ Association was able to provide information to the SEC, bypassing
Swiss bank secrecy laws.146 If certain conditions were met, asset freezing assistance was also available under this MOU.147
This assistance was limited to insider trading investigations;
thus it was not available for most securities law violations.148
Nevertheless, since the exchange of diplomatic notes between
the United States and Switzerland in 1993, this narrow scope
of assistance has been expanded to include various securities
law violations.149
The MOUs signed by the United States with Canada, the
U.K., and Hong Kong recognize a broad range of assistance in
gathering evidence.150 In particular, these agreements call for
“the fullest mutual assistance,” 151 requiring that authorities
assist each other in (1) “providing . . . information in the files of
the requested [a]uthority,” 152 (2) “taking the evidence of persons,” 153 and (3) “obtaining documents from persons.” 154 Such
assistance is governed by “the laws of the jurisdiction of the
requested [a]uthority.”155 The scope of assistance agreed upon
by these three countries is reflected in the IOSCO MMOU.156
146. 1982 U.S.–Switz. MOU, supra note 137, pt. III, para. 1; Agreement
XVI of the Swiss Bankers’ Association, supra note 145, art. 4.
147. Agreement XVI of the Swiss Bankers’ Association, supra note 145, art.
9, para. 1.
148. 1982 U.S.–Switz. MOU, supra note 137, pt. I, para. 1, pt. III, para. 2.
149. SEC NEWS DIGEST, supra note 138, at 2; 1993 U.S.-Switz. Notes, supra
note 138, at 1 (Letter from Warren Christopher, Sec’y of State, to Carlo Jagmetti, Ambassador of Switzerland).
150. See U.S.-Can. MOU, supra note 139, art. 2; U.S.-U.K. MOU, supra note
140, pt. II, para. 6; U.S.-H.K. MOU, supra note 141, para. 3.1.
151. U.S.-Can. MOU, supra note 139, art. 2, para. 1; U.S.-H.K. MOU, supra
note 141, para. 3.1.1. The MOU between the U.S. and the U.K. also has a
similar provision. See U.S.-U.K. MOU, supra note 140, pt. II, para. 6.
152. U.S.-Can. MOU, supra note 139, art. 2, para. 2(a).
153. Id. art. 2, para. 2(b).
154. Id. art. 2, para. 2(c). MOUs signed by the U.S. with the U.K. and Hong
Kong also have similar provisions. See U.S.-U.K. MOU, supra note 140, pt. II,
para. 6; U.S.-H.K. MOU, supra note 141, para. 3.1.2.
155. U.S.-U.K. MOU, supra note 140, pt. IV, para. 13(a). MOUs signed by
the U.S. with Canada and Hong Kong also have similar provisions. See U.S.Can. MOU, supra note 139, art. 5, para. 3; U.S.-H.K. MOU, supra note 141,
para. 3.4.3.
156. Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information
art.
7(b),
May
2002,
available
at
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Such a broad range of assistance in information sharing is
necessary, but not sufficient, to establish an effective international enforcement mechanism.157 In particular, assistance in
freezing assets is also indispensable to combatting international securities fraud, for if wrongdoers can enjoy the proceeds of
their fraudulent activities even after they are detected, the deterrent function of securities laws is decreased.158 In light of the
importance of freezing assets, it is problematic that the MOUs
signed by the United States with Canada, the U.K., and Hong
Kong do not explicitly provide for assistance in this regard.159
b. International Organization of Securities Commissions Multilateral MOU (IOSCO MMOU)
i. Overview
IOSCO was established in 1983 to promote regulatory cooperation in global securities markets. 160 It started with only
eleven members—all of them North and South American securities regulators. 161 Later, from 1984 onward, non-American
regulators also began to enter IOSCO.162 Accordingly, with the
constant expansion of its membership, it has admitted securities regulators from more than one hundred countries, involving over 95% of global securities markets.163 IOSCO now functions as a primary governmental cluster to promote internahttp://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD386.pdf
[hereinafter
IOSCO MMOU] (rev. May 2012).
157. See Michael D. Mann et al., The Establishment of International Mechanisms for Enforcing Provisional Orders and Final Judgments Arising from
Securities Law Violations, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 303, 304 (1992), available
at http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1192113.pdf?acceptTC=true (“Effective
enforcement of securities laws requires that regulators be able to thwart the
dissipation or secreting of the fruits of international securities fraud, and to
facilitate the return of the illicit profits to injured investors.”).
158. Id.; David Chaikin, The Freezing of Criminal Assets, 8 COMMW. L.
BULL. 1197, 1198 (1982) (discussing the illegal gains of general crimes).
159. See generally U.S.-U.K. MOU, supra note 140; U.S.-Can. MOU, supra
note 139; U.S.-H.K. MOU, supra note 141.
160. About
IOSCO:
IOSCO
Historical
Background,
IOSCO,
http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=background (last visited Sept.
14, 2011) [hereinafter IOSCO Historical Background].
161. Id.
162. See id.; see also Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation,
98 CAL. L. REV. 327, 338 (2010).
163. IOSCO Historical Background, supra note 160.
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tional cooperation in the context of securities regulation.164 In
particular, IOSCO has promoted a Multilateral Memorandum
of Understanding since 2002.165 The purpose of this MMOU is
to “facilitate cross-border enforcement and exchange of information among international securities regulators.”166 In recent
years, a significant number of regulators have signed the
IOSCO MMOU, 167 and they have frequently employed the
MMOU mechanisms for their enforcement cooperation.168

164. See id.; see also Brummer, supra note 162, at 338.
165. IOSCO Historical Background, supra note 160.
166. Id.
167. Currently, ninety-seven authorities are listed as signatories in Appendix A of the MMOU. Current Signatories, supra note 26.
168. In 2003, fifty-six requests were filed under the MMOU; in 2004, 307
requests; in 2005, 384 requests; in 2006, 526 requests; in 2007, 726 requests;
in 2008, 867 requests; in 2009, 1261 requests; and in 2010, 1624 requests
were filed. IOSCO Library Section: Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information
(MMoU),
IOSCO,
http://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfm?section=mou_main (last visited Nov. 9,
2013).
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ii. Scope of Assistance
Article 7 of the IOSCO MMOU provides signatories with the
ability to use its complete domestic power.169 A requested signatory can thus choose from among three types of assistance to
execute, depending on the request.170 First of all, if a requesting
authority is seeking information in the possession of a requested authority, the latter can comply under the MMOU by simply
sending the information to the former.171 On the other hand, if
a requesting authority is seeking information that a requested
authority does not have, the latter can use its investigative
power to obtain the documents and then send them to the former.172 Furthermore, in some instances, a requested authority
can compel a particular person to make statements or give testimony.173
The MMOU also specifies types of information that can be
shared. 174 The ability to obtain key information is crucial to
succeeding in securities investigations.175 Indeed, many authorities investigating securities fraud seek a broad range of information regarding investments, brokerage, transactions, and
management.176 Plenty of information can be obtained from entities regulated by a requested authority,177 but certain information is accessible only through unregulated entities.178 For
example, an authority investigating market manipulation or
insider trading usually requests bank records in order to track
money involved in fraud.179 Thus, in order to successfully combat market manipulation and insider trading, a requested authority must secure the ability to demand from unregulated

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

IOSCO MMOU, supra note 156, art. 7(a).
See id. arts. 7(b), 9.
Id. arts. 7(b)(i), 9(a).
Id. arts. 7(b)(ii), 9(b).
Id. arts. 7(b)(iii), 9(c).
See id. art. 7(b)(ii).
See CARVAJAL & ELLIOTT, supra note 142, at 15.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id.
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entities information that it can then deliver to a requesting authority.180
For this reason, the MMOU provides that an authority can
share not only information obtained from a regulated entity,
but also records received from an unregulated one, namely, a
bank.181 Article 7 stipulates that signatory authorities can perform a mutual exchange of (1) “contemporaneous records sufficient to reconstruct all securities and derivatives transactions,
including records of all funds and assets transferred into and
out of bank and brokerage accounts relating to these transactions”; 182 (2) “records that identify: the beneficial owner and
controller, and for each transaction, the account holder; the
amount purchased or sold; the time of the transaction; the price
of the transaction; and the individual and the bank or broker
and brokerage house that handled the transaction”;183 and (3)
“information identifying persons who beneficially own or control non-natural [p]ersons organized in the jurisdiction of the
[r]equested [a]uthority.”184
Despite these provisions, authorities have in recent years
sought a range of information broader than what the MMOU
requires they share while investigating insider trading and
market manipulation. 185 In particular, authorities often find
crucial evidence of insider trading from telephone conversations and Internet service history,186 which are not made available under any explicit provision of the IOSCO MMOU.187

180. Id.
181. See IOSCO MMOU, supra note 156, arts. 7(b)(ii), 9(b).
182. Id. art. 7(b)(ii).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See CARVAJAL & ELLIOTT, supra note 142, at 16; see, e.g., United States
v. Rajaratnam, 802 F. Supp. 2d 491, 499–500, 502, 507–12, 514–16 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (showing that telephone conversations, instant messages, and emails
exchanged between defendants revealed that the defendants committed insider trading).
186. See CARVAJAL & ELLIOTT, supra note 142, at 16; see, e.g., Rajaratnam,
802 F. Supp. 2d at 499–500, 502, 507–12, 514–16.
187. See generally IOSCO MMOU, supra note 156, art. 7(b)(ii).
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2. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs)
a. Overview
Besides MOUs, two countries often enter into treaties regarding mutual legal assistance in criminal proceedings.188 Such an
agreement is called an MLAT. 189 Though this treaty applies
only in criminal cases, the SEC can nonetheless use it to “obtain assistance in any investigation that relates to any securities violation that might be punishable by criminal sanctions.”190 Thus, an MLAT can be a powerful tool for securities
authorities to conduct international enforcement. 191 This is
primarily because an MLAT contains its own binding power192
and allows various types of assistance.193 In the United States,
this treaty is usually maintained by the DOJ.194 As of 2011, the
DOJ maintains MLATs with a number of foreign countries,195
including Switzerland in 1973, Canada in 1985, the U.K. in

188. Lynda M. Ruiz, Note, European Community Directive on Insider Dealing: A Model for Effective Enforcement of Prohibitions on Insider Trading in
International Securities Markets, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 217, 231 (1995);
see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2011, at 43, 55,
161, 265, 294 (2011) [hereinafter TREATIES IN FORCE], available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/169274.pdf.
189. Ruiz, supra note 188, at 231.
190. Mills et al., supra note 132, at 499; see also DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT,
SEC, supra note 27, § 3.3.6.3.
191. See Friedman et al., supra note 21, at 42.
192. See Paul Coggins & William A. Roberts, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction:
An Untamed Adolescent, 17 COMMW. L. BULL. 1391, 1402 (1991) (addressing
the fact that MLATs legally oblige countries to provide assistance to each
other); see also DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, SEC, supra note 27, § 3.3.6.3 (“MLATs
may be an effective mechanism to obtain assistance when an MOU with a
particular country either does not exist or does not permit the type of information sought from a witness residing overseas.”).
193. See John E. Harris, International Cooperation in Fighting Transnational Organized Crime: Special Emphasis on Mutual Legal Assistance and
Extradition, in United Nations Asia & Far E. Inst. for the Prevention of
Crime and Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI), Annual Report for 1999 and
Resource Material Series No. 57, at 133, 139 (Sept. 2001), available at
http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no57/57-11.pdf
(listing the
types of assistance that can be provided under MLATs).
194. DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, SEC, supra note 27, § 3.3.6.3.
195. Id.; see, e.g., TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 188, at 43, 55, 161, 265,
294.
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1994, Hong Kong in 1997, and South Korea in 1993.196 Thus, in
order to obtain assistance from these countries under their
MLATs, the SEC must ask the DOJ to assume the requesting
process on its behalf. 197 This MLAT process proves useful in
cases where MOUs are not available.198
b. Making Requests
Most MLATs specify how to make a request for assistance.199
MLATs do not usually allow securities authorities to make a
request directly to their counterparts.200 Instead, they require
authorities to communicate with each other through an official
channel for administrating MLAT procedures, namely, a “Central Authority.”201 Given this requirement, all requests and responses to requests must be made through each country’s respective Central Authority on behalf of other regulatory authorities in the country.202
Indeed, MLATs signed by the United States with Switzerland, Canada, the U.K., Hong Kong, and South Korea all have
provisions to appoint Central Authorities for each party.203 Under these MLATs, in the United States, the Central Authority
196. U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27; U.S.-Can. MLAT, supra note 27;
U.S.-U.K. MLAT, supra note 27; U.S.-H.K. MLAT, supra note 27; U.S.-S. Korea MLAT, supra note 27.
197. See, e.g., U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27, ch. VII, art. 28; U.S.-Can.
MLAT, supra note 27, arts. I, VI, para. 1; U.S.-U.K. MLAT, supra note 27,
art. 2; U.S-H.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2; U.S.-S. Korea MLAT, supra
note 27, art. 2.
198. DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, SEC, supra note 27, § 3.3.6.3.
199. See U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27, ch. VII, art. 28; U.S.-Can.
MLAT, supra note 27, art. VI; U.S.-U.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2; U.S.H.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2; U.S.-S. Korea MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2.
200. Beard, supra note 129, at 274.
201. Harris, supra note 193, at 140; see also U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note
27, ch. VII, art. 28; U.S.-Can. MLAT, supra note 27, art. VI, para. 1; U.S.U.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, paras. 3–4; U.S.-H.K. MLAT, supra note
27, art. 2, para. 3; U.S.-S. Korea MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, paras. 1, 3.
202. Beard, supra note 129, at 274; see also U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note
27, ch. VII, art. 28, paras. 1–2; U.S.-Can. MLAT, supra note 27, art. VI, para.
1; U.S.-U.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, para. 3; U.S.-H.K. MLAT, supra
note 27, art. 2, para. 3; U.S.-S. Korea MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, para. 1.
203. U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27, ch. VII, art. 28, para. 1; U.S.-Can.
MLAT, supra note 27, art. I; U.S.-U.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, paras. 1–
2; U.S.-H.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, paras. 1–2; U.S.-S. Korea MLAT,
supra note 27, art. 2, paras. 1–2.
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is the Attorney General or his designee;204 in Switzerland, the
Division of Police of the Federal Department of Justice and Police in Bern;205 in Canada, the Minister of Justice or his designee;206 in the U.K., the Secretary of State for the Home Department or his designee;207 in Hong Kong, the Attorney General of
Hong Kong or his designee; 208 and in Korea, the Minister of
Justice or his designee.209
c. The Demands of Dual Criminality
MLATs often require that a request demonstrate dual criminality.210 Under this requirement, a case specified in a request
must constitute a crime in not only the requesting but also the
requested jurisdiction.211 For example, the MLAT between the
United States and Switzerland stipulates that each party can
use its compulsory power for the purpose of assistance when
“an offense . . . would be punishable under the law in the requested [s]tate if committed within its jurisdiction and [it] is
listed in the [s]chedule [of the treaty].”212 The MLATs signed by
the United States with Hong Kong and South Korea also require that the request show dual criminality.213 Under each of
these three MLATs, however, dual criminality is not demanded

204. U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27, ch. VII, art. 28, para. 1; U.S.-Can.
MLAT, supra note 27, art. I; U.S.-U.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, para. 2;
U.S.-H.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, para. 2; U.S.-S. Korea MLAT, supra
note 27, art. 2, para. 2.
205. U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27, ch. VII, art. 28, para. 1.
206. U.S.-Can. MLAT, supra note 27, art. I.
207. U.S.-U.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, para. 2.
208. U.S.-H.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, para. 2.
209. U.S.-S. Korea MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, para. 2.
210. See U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27, ch. I, art. 4, para. 2; U.S.-H.K.
MLAT, supra note 27, art. 3, para. 1(d); U.S.-S. Korea MLAT, supra note 27,
art. 3, para. 1(d).
211. Harris, supra note 193, at 140.
212. U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27, ch. I, art. 4, para. 2. Under this
MLAT, however, dual criminality is not demanded in cases where requests
involve “offenses against the laws relating to bookmaking, lotteries and gambling when conducted as a business.” Id. app. at 49.
213. U.S.-H.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 3, para. 1(d); U.S.-S. Korea
MLAT, supra note 27, art. 3, para. 1(d).
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in cases where requests involve certain crimes listed in its Annex.214
Arguably, discarding the dual criminality requirement would,
in fact, promote better cooperation. 215 Because each country
defines securities law violations in different ways, a requirement of this sort can actually impede international cooperation.216 Indeed, the MLATs signed by the United States with
Canada and the U.K. have no provision of dual criminality.217
Thus, assistance is available under these MLATs as long as a
requested case is criminally liable in a requesting country.218
III. REFORMING MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING TOWARD
GREATER ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION
A. Enhancing Mechanisms for Cooperation in Asset Freezing
1. Ineffectiveness of Current Methods
Assistance in freezing assets is indispensable to combatting
international securities fraud because if violators cannot enjoy
the proceeds of the frauds, the deterrent function of securities
laws will increase. 219 Securities regulators, therefore, often
seek to freeze assets abroad through cooperative mechanisms. 220 Unfortunately, examining the methods that are
available reveals that they are too lengthy and unstable for se-

214. U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27, ch. I, art. 4, para. 2(b); U.S.-H.K.
MLAT, supra note 27, art. 3, annex; U.S.-S. Korea MLAT, supra note 27, art.
3, annex.
215. See Beard, supra note 129, at 274 (explaining the MLAT between the
U.S. and Switzerland).
216. See id.; PICKHOLZ, supra note 137, §§ 4:42, 4:45.
217. U.S.-Can. MLAT, supra note 27, art. II, para. 3; Warren Christopher,
Letter of Submittal to Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-U.K., Jan. 6, 1994, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 104-2, 1994 U.S.T. LEXIS
205, at *4 (1995) [hereinafter Letter of Submittal].
218. See U.S.-Can. MLAT, supra note 27, art. II, para. 3; Letter of Submittal, supra note 217, at *4.
219. See Chaikin, supra note 158, at 1198 (discussing the illegal gains of
general crimes); see also Mann et al., supra note 157, at 304; see also Ethiopas Tafara, Dir., Office of Int’l Affairs, SEC, IOSCO Annual Conference:
Pub. Discussion Panel on Combating Fin. Crime Globally (Oct. 17, 2003),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch101703iosco.htm [hereinafter IOSCO
Annual Conference].
220. See OFFICE OF INT’L AFFAIRS, supra note 23, at 5.
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curities enforcement and thus are not as effective as they
should be.221
For example, MLATs can be used to freeze assets abroad if a
treaty has been arranged beforehand.222 This method, however,
is not effective for securities enforcement because MLATs are
designed for criminal prosecution and often require a request to
demonstrate dual criminality.223 Furthermore, MLATs are generally administered by criminal authorities, such as the DOJ,
and not by securities regulators. 224 Indeed, most MLATs require that a request be processed through a Central Authority,
which is designated in each MLAT.225 Generally, each country
designates the Ministry of Justice or the Attorney General to
carry out this position.226 For instance, in all MLATs to which
the United States is a signatory, either the Attorney General,
who serves as head of the DOJ,227 or his designee serves as the
Central Authority;228 but using the Central Authority is not an
effective process in international securities enforcement because securities regulators cannot directly make a request to
foreign counterparts. 229 Such bureaucracy in the requesting
process can also delay the execution of assistance. Indeed, in
order to use MLATs to obtain information from a foreign securities agency, the SEC must ask the DOJ to make a request so
that the DOJ may then forward the request to the designated
221. See IOSCO Annual Conference, supra note 219.
222. OFFICE OF INT’L AFFAIRS, supra note 23, at 5; see also Mann et al., supra
note 157, at 323–24.
223. See, e.g., U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27, ch. I, art. 4, para. 2; U.S.H.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 3, para. 1(d); U.S.-S. Korea MLAT, supra
note 27, art. 3, para. 1(d); see Beard, supra note 129, at 273–74.
224. See Beard, supra note 129, at 273 & n.14, 274.
225. See, e.g., U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27; U.S.-Can. MLAT, supra
note 27, arts. I, VI, para. 1; U.S.-U.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2; U.S.-H.K.
MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2; U.S.-S. Korea MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2.
226. Harris, supra note 193, at 140.
227. 28 U.S.C. § 503 (2006).
228. See, e.g., U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27, ch. VII, art. 28, para. 1;
U.S.-Can. MLAT, supra note 27, art. I; U.S.-U.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art.
2, para. 2; U.S.-H.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, para. 2; U.S.-S. Korea
MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, para. 2; see also U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, Title 9
Criminal Resource Manual 276: Treaty Requests, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’
MANUAL,
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00276.h
tm.
229. Beard, supra note 129, at 274.
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Central Authority of a foreign country rather than to the agency with the relevant expertise and knowledge. 230 In recent
years, as securities law enforcement has increasingly required
prompt action, 231 this process has become particularly problematic.
Securities regulators have another option besides using
MLATs: namely, to bring a civil action in a foreign court and
thereby seek to freeze illegal proceeds.232 This method suffers
from its own difficulties. If the SEC opts to use this method, it
may be exposed to risks of litigation, in addition to facing difficult situations wherein a foreign court may require the SEC to
pay financial undertakings for the filing of injunctions.233 Indeed, in SEC v. Lydia Capital,234 the SEC was faced with legal
challenges that compelled it to pay financial undertakings.235
2. Need for the MOU Approach
To overcome the deficiencies in using the two methods mentioned above, securities regulators should enter into MOUs
that require them to take all necessary steps to assist their foreign counterparts in obtaining asset freezes where the assets
are located. 236 If securities regulators use MOUs instead of
MLATs or civil actions, enforcement cooperation can be more
effective, because securities regulators can directly communicate with one another to freeze assets abroad.237 Indeed, when
entering into these types of MOUs, authorities specializing in
230. See U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27, ch. VII, art. 28; U.S.-Can.
MLAT, supra note 27, art. VI, para. 1; U.S.-U.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2;
U.S.-H.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2; U.S.-S. Korea MLAT, supra note 27,
art. 2.
231. See Friedman et al., supra note 21, at 48.
232. IOSCO Annual Conference, supra note 219.
233. Id.
234. SEC v. Lydia Capital, No. 07-10712-RGS, 2008 WL 509136 (D. Mass.
Feb. 21, 2008).
235. SEC Obtains Asset Freeze in the United Kingdom Against Hedge Fund
DUNN
(June
25,
2008),
available
at
Principal,
GIBSON
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/SECAssetFreezeInUKAgains
tHedgeFundPrincipal.aspx.
236. See Mann et al., supra note 157, at 326 (arguing that the MOU would
be a useful tool for “enforcing provisional orders and final judgments”); see
also Friedman et al., supra note 21, at 50 (calling for international assistance
in freezing assets).
237. See IOSCO Annual Conference, supra note 219 (illustrating Canadian
experience in cross-border asset-freezing assistance).
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securities laws can directly negotiate and administer agreements so as to close the differences in securities enforcement
regimes. 238 In addition, by directly communicating under
MOUs, securities regulators can more quickly help freeze assets than they can under MLATs, which require an indirect
and bureaucratic process. 239 Even so, MOUs signed by the
United States with Canada, the U.K., and Hong Kong do not
currently have explicit provisions to assist in freezing assets
abroad.240 The IOSCO MMOU, likewise, does not require asset
freezing assistance.241 Considering the benefits of direct cooperation, however, MOUs, including the IOSCO MMOU, should
incorporate asset freezing assistance in some way.242
3. Need for the Enhanced Domestic Authority of the U.S. SEC
The scope of “asset freezing assistance” can be broad, from
non-substantive assistance—for example, merely explaining
the asset-freezing process243—to substantive assistance—such
as obtaining asset freezes on behalf of a foreign authority.244
Complicating matters, many securities regulators cannot currently provide substantive assistance to their foreign counterparts.245 Indeed, most securities regulators may only be able to
provide information about the domestic legal framework—as
was the case when the U.K. Financial Services Authority
(“U.K. FSA” or “FSA”) provided it to the SEC in Lydia Capi238. See Mann et al., supra note 157, at 327.
239. See IOSCO Annual Conference, supra note 219 (addressing efficiency
in asset-freezing assistance provided by Canadian regulators); see also Mann
et al., supra note 157, at 326–27.
240. See generally U.S.-U.K. MOU, supra note 140; U.S.-Can. MOU, supra
note 139; U.S.-H.K. MOU, supra note 141.
241. See generally IOSCO MMOU, supra note 156.
242. See Mann et al., supra note 157, at 327–28 (discussing that a possible
MOU without asset-freezing assistance thwarts prosecution efforts to seize
profits retained outside the United States, and describing how a potential
MOU requiring asset-freezing assistance could operate).
243. See, e.g., GIBSON DUNN, supra note 235 (describing how the U.K.’s FSA
assisted the SEC in freezing assets in Lydia Capital).
244. See, e.g., IOSCO Annual Conference, supra note 219.
245. See INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N’S PRESIDENTS COMM., RESOLUTION ON
CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION TO FREEZE ASSETS DERIVED FROM SECURITIES AND
DERIVATIVES
VIOLATIONS
1
(
June
7,
2006),
http://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES25.pdf
[hereinafter
IOSCO PRESIDENTS COMM.]; see also IOSCO Annual Conference, supra note
219.
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tal246—or, at most, to provide information about other channels
such as criminal authorities or private law firms. Thus, even if
securities regulators change their MOUs to include asset freezing assistance, the difficulties in freezing assets abroad will not
necessarily be eliminated. 247 This is primarily because most
securities regulators, including the SEC, “still lack sufficient
powers to freeze ill-gotten assets on behalf of a foreign regulator.” 248 Because of this, the foreign regulator must work
through criminal channels or private law firms to accomplish
any asset freezing in the United States; however, these channels are either ineffective or risky, as discussed above.249
For this reason, the U.S. Congress should consider authorizing the SEC to go to court in the name of foreign authorities to
obtain asset freezes.250 Along with this authority of representation, the SEC can provide substantive assistance under MOUs,
enhancing international cooperation accordingly.251
Indeed, securities regulators have recognized the importance
of the authority to seek asset freezes on behalf of foreign regu-

246. In this case, the SEC requested the FSA to provide legal advice.
GIBSON DUNN, supra note 235. This advice aided the SEC in understanding
the English legal system. See id. The SEC then directly brought a civil action
in the U.K. High Court, arguing that the assets should remain frozen. SEC
Obtains Asset Freeze in the United Kingdom Against Hedge Fund Manager,
SEC Litigation Release No. 20585 (May 19, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20585.htm; Aaron Helm, U.S.
SEC v. Manterfield: How Her Majesty’s Courts Assisted the SEC in the Fight
Against Global Financial Fraud, 18 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 523, 524 (2010)
(citing U.S. SEC v. Manterfield, [2008] EWHC (QB) 1349, Lloyd’s Rep. F.C.
477 (Eng.)).
247. See IOSCO PRESIDENTS COMM., supra note 245, at 1; see also IOSCO
Annual Conference, supra note 219.
248. See IOSCO PRESIDENTS COMM., supra note 245, at 1; IOSCO Annual
Conference, supra note 219.
249. See Beard, supra note 129, at 273–74 (discussing the ineffectiveness of
MLATs); see also IOSCO Annual Conference, supra note 219 (discussing
problems in filing civil proceedings in a foreign country). For the details of
this discussion, see supra Part III.A.1.
250. See, e.g., Securities Act, R.S.O. 2011, c. S.5, § 126(1)(b) (Can.) (granting
the Ontario Securities Commission the legal authority to temporarily freeze
assets in Canada on behalf of foreign authorities).
251. See IOSCO Annual Conference, supra note 219 (calling for “increasing
the abilities of securities regulators to freeze and repatriate assets on behalf
of foreign counterparts”).
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lators.252 In 1992, Michael D. Mann, who was the Director of
the SEC Office of International Affairs, argued in an article
that cooperation in enforcing provisional orders would benefit
from MOU approaches,253 and that “the foreign authority, pursuant to both the MOU and domestic law, would petition its
courts or proper authorities for relief on behalf of the SEC.”254
In 2003, Ethiopis Tafara, the current Director of the SEC Office
of International Affairs, also contended that “the next bold step
for securities regulators in their fight against cross-border financial crime . . . is increasing the ability of securities regulators to freeze and repatriate assets on behalf of foreign counterparts.”255
As did the domestic regulators, IOSCO recognized in 2006
that substantive assistance in freezing assets was crucial for
effective cooperation in securities enforcement,256 and reported
that “many jurisdictions still lack sufficient powers to freeze illgotten assets on behalf of a foreign regulator.”257 IOSCO, therefore, encouraged “[a]ll member regulators . . . to examine the
legal framework under which they operate and strive to develop, through law reform or otherwise, mechanisms by which
they or another authority within their jurisdiction could, on
behalf of foreign regulator, freeze assets derived from suspected and established cross-border securities and derivatives violations.”258
Furthermore, in 2008 the SEC entered into an enhanced enforcement MOU with the Australian Securities and Investment
Commission (“ASIC”),259 which addressed the matters of freezing assets abroad and restraining the distribution of illegal
profits. 260 Specifically, this MOU provided that “[e]ach
252. See generally Mann et al., supra note 157; IOSCO Annual Conference,
supra note 219.
253. Mann et al., supra note 157, at 326.
254. Id. at 328.
255. IOSCO Annual Conference, supra note 219.
256. IOSCO PRESIDENTS COMM., supra note 245, at 1.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 2; see also TECHNICAL COMM., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, AN
OVERVIEW OF THE WORK OF THE IOSCO TECHNICAL COMMITTEE 12 (Mar. 2007),
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD239.pdf.
259. PICKHOLZ, supra note 137, § 4:7.50.
260. Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation, Cooperation
and the Exchange of Information Related to the Enforcement of Securities
Laws,
U.S.-Austl.,
art.
3,
Aug.
25,
2008,
available
at
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[a]uthority . . . [confirm] its commitment to seek the legal authority to assist the other [a]uthority in freezing assets in its
jurisdiction that constitute proceeds of a possible violation of
[l]aws and/or [r]egulations, and [to] facilitate restitution to investors.”261 Christopher Cox, who was Chairman of the SEC at
that time, explained that under this enhanced enforcement
MOU “the SEC and ASIC are . . . committed to seeking asset
freezes on each other’s behalf, and to assisting with the restitution of funds to injured investors.”262
Despite a series of efforts, however, the SEC still lacks the
legal authority to obtain asset freezes on behalf of foreign authorities. 263 Indeed, the SEC cannot provide any substantive
assistance in freezing assets even if MOUs are arranged. 264
This is primarily because the Exchange Act has no explicit provision authorizing the SEC to seek asset freezes on behalf of
foreign regulators. In the context of information sharing, the
SEC has the firm legal authority to obtain information on behalf of foreign authorities, thus allowing it to substantively cooperate with its foreign counterparts under MOUs. 265 Until
1988, however, the SEC had not been able to use its investigative power to assist foreign authorities266 because “§ 21(a) of the
Exchange Act, in its original version, limited the SEC’s ability

http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_mututal_recognition/australia/enhan
ced_enforcement_mou.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Austl. MOU].
261. Id.
262. Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Speech at the International Enforcement Institute: The Importance of International Enforcement Cooperation
in
Today’s
Markets
(Nov.
7,
2008),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch110708cc.htm.
263. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-92-110, SECURITIES
AND FUTURES MARKETS: CROSS-BORDER INFORMATION SHARING IS IMPROVING,
BUT
OBSTACLES
REMAIN
48
(1992),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/152094.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. Many
securities regulators lack this power. IOSCO Annual Conference, supra note
219.
264. See GAO REPORT, supra note 263, at 48; see also IOSCO Annual Conference, supra note 219.
265. Mann et al., supra note 157, at 319–20; see also Securities and Exchange Commission Historical Society Interview with Ethiopis Tafara Conducted on April 19, 2006 by Wayne Carroll, at 2, available at
http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/collection/oralhistories/tafara041906Transcript.pdf.
266. Mann et al., supra note 157, at 318–19.
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to investigate violations of ‘this Title.’”267 In order to solve this
problem, Congress added Section 21(a)(2) to the Exchange Act,
thereby authorizing the SEC to conduct investigations for the
purpose of gathering evidence and information for foreign securities regulators.268 In the context of asset freezing assistance,
however, the Exchange Act does not yet provide the SEC with
explicit legal authority to act on behalf of foreign authorities.269
The ability to obtain a court order to freeze assets on behalf of
foreign regulators will enable the SEC to provide substantive
assistance in freezing assets, thereby enhancing international
cooperation.270
For example, the Ontario Securities Act of Canada grants the
Ontario Securities Commission (“OSC”) the legal authority to
temporarily freeze assets in Canada on behalf of foreign authorities. 271 Foreign securities regulators can thus take advantage of this representing authority in Canada by requesting
the OSC to exercise its power to freeze assets on a temporary
basis.272 Therefore, cross-border securities enforcement will be
far more effective if all other securities regulators also obtain
the power to obtain asset freezes on behalf of their foreign
counterparts.273
The U.S. Congress, therefore, ought to consider passing legislation that gives the SEC power to seek asset freezes in a U.S.
court in the name of foreign regulators.274 These regulators can
then take advantage of this authority by requesting the SEC to
exercise it.275 Furthermore, such legislation can encourage other countries to adopt similar provisions.276 If the SEC and foreign securities regulators have the legal authority to obtain as267. Id. at 319 n.68; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(a), 48
Stat. 899.
268. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(2) (2006); see also Friedman et al., supra note
21, at 40; Mann et al., supra note 157, at 319.
269. See GAO REPORT, supra note 263, at 48; see also IOSCO Annual Conference, supra note 219.
270. See IOSCO PRESIDENTS COMM., supra note 245, at 1; see also IOSCO
Annual Conference, supra note 219.
271. Securities Act, R.S.O. 2011, c. S.5, § 126(1)(b) (Can.).
272. OFFICE OF INT’L AFFAIRS, supra note 23, at 5.
273. See IOSCO Annual Conference, supra note 219; see also IOSCO
PRESIDENTS COMM., supra note 245, at 1.
274. See, e.g., Securities Act, R.S.O. 2011, c. S.5, § 126(1)(b) (Can.).
275. See OFFICE OF INT’L AFFAIRS, supra note 23, at 5.
276. Mann et al., supra note 157, at 329.
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set freezes on each other’s behalf, they can then maximize the
benefits of MOUs providing for asset freezing assistance.277
B. Requiring Exchange of a Broader Range of Information
To ensure more effective cooperation, the IOSCO MMOU
needs to explicitly require signatories to obtain telephone or
Internet records necessary for foreign counterparts’ investigations.278 The ability to obtain such information is crucial in successfully combatting international insider trading, for telephone records and Internet service histories often provide authorities with crucial evidence of insider trading.279 Specifically,
in United States v. Rajaratnam, telephone conversations, instant messages, and emails exchanged between Raj Rajaratnam and other defendants showed that he obtained inside
information from various sources, and either disclosed that information as a tip, or traded stock based on it.280 Thus, many
authorities have recently sought a range of information broader
than what the MMOU allows, particularly when these authorities are investigating insider trading.281
Despite the need for a broader range of information, there is
no explicit provision of the MMOU that allows securities regulators to seek telephone and Internet records from foreign authorities.282 This limitation of the MMOU may impede effective
enforcement cooperation among signatories, inasmuch as they
would have to seek the same information through other mech277. See id.
278. See CARVAJAL & ELLIOTT, supra note 142, at 16 (stating that telephone
and Internet records can be crucial evidence in insider trading cases).
279. Id.
280. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 802 F. Supp. 2d 491, 499–500, 502,
507–12, 514–16 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also Tzyh Ng, The Voice of the Galleon
TIMES
(May
11,
2011),
Trial,
N.Y.
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/the-voices-of-the-galleon-trial/ (indicating links to the telephone recordings regarding insider trading); see also
Douglas N. Greenburg et al., Prosecutors Without Borders: Emerging Trends
in Extraterritorial Enforcement, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE CORPORATE LAW
AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, 1882 PLI/CORP 149, 167–68 (2011),
available at http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub4122_1.pdf.
281. See CARVAJAL & ELLIOTT, supra note 142, at 17 (describing a case where
telephone records served as an important source of evidence). See generally
IOSCO MMOU, supra note 156, art. 7(b)(ii) (specifying the types of information that should be obtained under the IOSCO MMOU).
282. See generally IOSCO MMOU, supra note 156, art. 7(b)(ii).
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anisms. One such option for obtaining telephone and Internet
records is to use a bilateral MOU that has been arranged between regulators.283 The bilateral MOUs, however, cannot cover a broad range of jurisdictions.284 A second path to acquiring
telephone and Internet information might be to use MLAT procedures, 285 though these are limited to criminal cases. 286 The
last option for obtaining that information involves using informal channels;287 however, with respect to these informal methods, reliability and cooperativeness are often uncertain, making
it difficult to anticipate whether the information is obtainable.
For this reason, the IOSCO MMOU should contain an explicit
provision requiring signatories to obtain telephone or Internet
records for assistance.
CONCLUSION
This article has discussed international cooperation in securities enforcement, with particular emphasis placed on detecting,
investigating, and prosecuting hedge fund fraud and market
manipulation. It has revealed several concerns about current
international enforcement systems for cross-border hedge fund
fraud. A major concern is that the current MOUs have not been
effective in combatting multinational hedge fund fraud. 288
Thus, this article calls for revisions of the MOUs. Specifically,
bilateral MOUs and the IOSCO MMOU should explicitly pro-

283. Except for an MOU signed between the SEC and an Australian regulator, bilateral MOUs do not usually contain an explicit provision requiring
exchange of telephone or Internet records. See U.S.-Austl. MOU, supra note
260, at 9; see also U.S.-U.K. MOU, supra note 140; U.S.-Can. MOU, supra
note 139; U.S.-H.K. MOU, supra note 141; see also SEC International Enforcement Assistance, supra note 25.
284. The SEC entered into MOUs with only twenty different countries’ authorities before IOSCO created the MMOU. SEC International Enforcement
Assistance, supra note 25. Indeed, the SEC has no bilateral MOU with any
Korean securities regulator. See SEC, Cooperative Arrangements with Foreign Regulators, supra note 24. By contrast, the number of full signatories of
the IOSCO MMOU currently stands at ninety-seven. Current Signatories,
supra note 26.
285. See Friedman et al., supra note 21, at 42.
286. See Greene, supra note 131, at 640 (stating that MLATs can be employed only for criminal cases).
287. See OFFICE OF INT’L AFFAIRS, supra note 23, at 4; see also SEC International Enforcement Assistance, supra note 25.
288. See supra Part III.
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vide assistance in freezing assets.289 The IOSCO MMOU should
also be reformed by requiring that telephone records and Internet service history be shared. 290 These recommendations
would provide guidance for international enforcement systems
in order to promote a more cooperative environment.

289. See supra Part III.A.
290. See supra Part III.B.

